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CORPORATE MONITORSHIPS AND NEW GOVERNANCE REGULATION:
IN THEORY, IN PRACTICE, AND IN CONTEXT
Cristie Ford and David Hess1

Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 has had a profound impact on how we think
about regulating corporations. This article contributes to this discussion through a focus on the
potential role of settlement agreements in enforcement activity to change corporate behavior.
Referred to as either deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements2 in the criminal context
3

and reform undertakings in the civil regulatory context, this is an approach to regulation where
the government takes a direct role in reforming corporations‘ cultures and considerations of risk.
In exchange for leniency for alleged criminal or civil violations of the securities laws, a
corporation agrees to end its wrongful practices, develop and implement an improved
compliance program, and, in many cases (and most importantly for purposes of this article), hire
an independent monitor to oversee those undertakings and make recommendations for
improvement.

4

In theory, we believe monitorships have significant potential as a form of new
governance regulation focused on reforming corrupt corporate cultures (Ford 2005; Hess and
Ford 2008). As described further below, monitorships operate in space separate from an
adversarial, enforcement interaction, and therefore provide the opportunity to assist corporations
in meaningfully changing what former SEC Chairman William Donaldson referred to as their
―moral DNA.‖ (Ford 2005: 773).

However, with the increased use of these settlement

agreements with monitorships, doubts have emerged about their effectiveness as currently
implemented (Ford and Hess 2009).
In this paper, we focus on why corporations, monitors, and regulators, may deviate from
expectations of monitorships as a new governance mechanism. That is, what factors influence
actors‘ behavior in the monitorship context that may limit the potential effectiveness of
monitorships? Although we believe that monitorships can be effective (and can be further
improved through corrections to some of the potential problems we identify below), this
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research, and the example of the recent financial crisis, pushes us to consider larger questions
about how and to what degree new governance-style initiatives can consistently and reliably
promote better corporate conduct. Focusing primarily on the US experience, the first part of the
paper examines the history and context for the development of monitorships as prosecutorial or
enforcement tools. The next section describes our own research into monitorships, beginning
with an explanation of our normative commitment to new governance methods for dealing with
difficult problems of corporate ethical culture, and ending by identifying the ways in which
monitorship in practice fall substantially short of the ideal model we describe. The third major
section identifies a set of micro-sociological characteristics of the prosecutorial and monitorship
environment that push monitorships toward a status quo-favoring, under ambitious definition of
their mandate. We close by raising some additional issues about the usefulness of an expertisedriven process, the effect of an enforcement-based one, and the possibilities for a much more
radical, participatory, and open-ended process than we have yet seen.

Monitorships, Culture, and Compliance
Monitorships are part of a broader regulatory trend that recognizes the limits of regulating
corporations through external prescriptions and inspections, and therefore directs its energies
toward encouraging corporations to engage in meaningful self-regulation through the adoption of
effective internal compliance programs. In fact, efforts to ensure that corporations have in place
compliance and ethics programs have been a feature of corporate regulation for some time. In
the United States, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, first promulgated in 1992, seek to
encourage corporations to take the steps necessary to prevent organizational members from
breaking any laws. Those steps are to (1) adopt an ―effective‖ compliance and ethics program;
and (2) to ―promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law‖ (Lipman 2009).

Until recently, however, corporations had

significant freedom in how they chose to design and implement their compliance and ethics
programs within the basic framework of the Sentencing Guidelines.
That approach began to change around 2003, in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and
similar debacles.

Previously, when a corporation committed a crime, the United States

Department of Justice (DOJ) would prosecute the individuals that committed the wrongful acts
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and sometimes also the corporation. The corporation would receive a significant fine. A similar
strategy existed at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with
increasingly heavy fines being the norm through the early 2000s. Sometime around 2003, the
DOJ and SEC began to put greater emphasis on a controversial approach that intrudes more
directly on corporate governance. Through the use of settlement agreements, the DOJ, SEC,
FINRA, and some other American and Canadian securities regulators now may require
corporations to develop and implement improved compliance programs, and, most
controversially, to hire an independent monitor to oversee those undertakings and make
recommendations on necessary changes. Not all such agreements require the use of corporate
monitors (in our sample, described below, approximately 40 percent used monitors), but it
appears to be a growing trend. For example, during the US bank bailout in late 2008 and early
2009, former US Attorney General John Ashcroft noted the likelihood of significant wrongdoing
with respect to the use of bailout funds from the US government.

He suggested that

monitorships be used for corporations caught engaging in such economic crime (Ashcroft 2009).
Monitorships have been imposed on some very well-known corporations, such as
America Online, Boeing, Daimler AG, and Monsanto, and one of the most notorious players in
the recent financial crisis, AIG (though for reasons unrelated to credit default swaps or executive
bonuses (Lattman 2009)). Monitorships are not without controversy. The controversies around
corporate monitorships are typically based on anecdotal evidence and focus on the significant
costs to corporations of hiring monitors, monitors‘ potential to function as unaccountable ―czars‖
over the corporation (Khanna and Dickinson 2007), and conflicts of interest in the selection of
monitors, such as the selection of John Ashcroft by the DOJ (Lichtblau 2008).
The focus of our research is on whether or not monitorships, as implemented, are actually
likely to achieve the goal of forcing corporations to implement effective compliance and ethics
programs and improve the ethics aspects of their organizational cultures. By ―corporate ethical
culture,‖ we are referring to the informal control system within the organization. The formal
control systems include the company policies, structures, and operational processes that play an
indispensable role in keeping firms law-abiding. Culture goes beyond those easily visible
organizational features, and includes the basic assumptions, values, and expectations that
influence employees‘ behavior (see Schein 2004; O‘Rielly 1989).

3
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Firm cultures are not monolithic, easily described, or completely determinative of
individual behavior. Nevertheless, understanding and managing corporate culture is necessary
because individual ethical behavior is deeply affected by situational factors. That is, not all
organizational wrongdoing can be blamed on a few individuals that act on their own initiative to
break the rules to further their own interests. In many cases, the root cause of the wrongdoing is
found in conditions existing at the organizational level. For example, a recent survey of over
5,000 employees across several industries asked what they viewed as the ―root cause‖ of
misconduct within their organizations, and over half of employees cited organizational factors,
such as ―pressure to do whatever it takes to meet business targets‖ and a belief that ―their code of
conduct is not taken seriously.‖ Only one-third attributed the wrongdoing to employees bending
the rules for their own personal gain (KPMG 2008, 6). Numerous social scientific studies also
support the relationship between personal ethical behavior and organizational culture (see
Treviño et al. 2006; Treviño and Weaver 2003). Thus, if the response to wrongdoing is simply
to terminate the employment of the individual wrongdoers without changing the context in which
those individuals operated, then wrongdoing may well continue to occur in the future.
According to the Ethics Resource Center, ―[e]thical culture is the single biggest factor
determining the amount of misconduct in [an] organization‖ (Ethics Resource Center 2007, 26).
The most recently revised Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, from 2004, recognize that a
compliance program will not be effective if the organization has a culture that does not support
the compliance program or perhaps even runs counter to the goals of the compliance program.
Kaptein provides a list of certain ―organizational virtues‖ that can be a part of an organization‘s
culture, which work to encourage ethical behavior and discourage unethical behavior (Kaptein
2009). This list includes such matters as the extent to which ethical expectations are understood
by employees, the organizational support for ethical behavior, an environment that supports the
open discussion of ethical issues, and transparency with respect to the consequences of ethical
and unethical behavior. Importantly, each of these elements of an organization‘s culture can be
influenced by management (Kaptein 2009).

5

In other words, although an organization‘s culture

develops slowly over time and is difficult to change, certain aspects—including those that relate
to ethical behavior—can prove responsive to appropriate effort and attention. Managing these
aspects of culture is an important part of implementing an effective compliance program.

4
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What we draw from this is that, to achieve the goal of reforming corporate behavior,
corporate monitorships must also engage with organizational culture. This is not uncontroversial.
Corporate culture, broadly defined, also relates to the corporation‘s strategy, for example, and
therefore can have a direct impact on long-term shareholder value. Not everyone would agree
that these are appropriate concerns for a monitor. On the other hand, there is evidence that the
failure to look at culture results in less effective compliance programs (Tyler et al. 2008), and in
some cases can result in counterproductive compliance programs (if the employees perceive the
program is designed simply to protect upper management from blame for any wrongdoing that
occurs) (Treviño et al. 1999). Because corporate culture is important, we argue that settlement
agreements involving corrupt corporations must ensure that monitors focus on culture in two
ways (Ford and Hess 2008). First, monitors must determine what aspects of the corporation‘s
culture contributed to the wrongdoing, including whether the culture encouraged wrongdoing or
discouraged the reporting of wrongdoing by other employees. Second, the monitor must ensure
that management is actively concerning itself with the organization‘s culture going forward as
part of its implementation of a revised compliance program. A new governance approach,
discussed below, provides insights into how a monitorship can be structured to best achieve these
goals and encapsulates our normative stance with regard to making possible sustainable,
endogenous reform to corporate ethical culture.

Monitorships as New Governance Regulation
The corporate monitorship is an enforcement innovation that is compatible with the larger
new governance regulatory frame. The notion that monitorships should, in fact, be seen in
ambitious new governance terms was catalyzed by claims by DOJ officials and SEC
enforcement staffers to the effect that enforcement action can ―effect change [to internal controls,
supervisory procedures, and compliance functions] on an enormous scale‖ (Ford 2005). As
such, our work on monitorships draws on a broader body of new governance scholarship around
structural reform litigation (Sturm 1979; Sabel and Simon 2004; Sturm 2006).
Our attraction to new governance derives from its potential, in theory, to catalyze a more
meaningful process of corporate cultural reform than more traditional enforcement techniques,
based on fines and other sanctions, can do. A new governance approach imagines regulation that

5
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is informed and underpinned by a decentered, horizontal experimental process. The process uses
pragmatic problem solving techniques, including especially highly participatory and structured
dialogue. As a matter of institutional design, it relies on information-forcing techniques such as
reason-giving, transparent and explicit dialogic and analytical processes, benchmarking, and
outcome analysis. It employs an incrementalist approach that seeks to incorporate situational
learning into subsequent practice, and also to promote the mutual and ongoing revision of both
means and ends by way of a flexible, ―best practices‖-driven process. New governance also has
ramifications for the regulator‘s role, in that these experiences are then rolled into a
public/private matrix (Freeman 2000) within which the regulator oversees the coordination and
sharing of information from localized experiments and pushes localities to improve by
comparison to experience of others.

The relationship between new governance and other

contemporary regulatory forms, including responsive regulation, outcome-oriented regulation, or
risk-based regulation, is beyond this paper‘s scope (but see Gilad 2010, Ford 2011). However,
new governance has an affinity with management-based regulation (Coglianese and Lazer 2003)
and meta-regulation (Parker 2002; Gilad 2010) in particular, which focus on the analytical
processes that organizations use to reach their conclusions and the establishment of a learningby-doing regulatory architecture.
As applied to settlement agreements imposing corporate monitors, a new governance
style endeavor would involve a broadly participatory, dialogic, and transparent process
emphasizing root cause analysis rather than a superficial compliance audit. The monitor would
be closely engaged in facilitating dialogue and problem solving at all levels of the corporate
hierarchy.

The monitorship would take place after the enforcement action had been

provisionally settled, and continue for a period of time long enough to permit a careful, less
instrumental investigation. It would be structured to be flexible, open-ended, and capable of
learning from its own experience. On this model, the monitor is stationed in the organization not
as an agent of the government, but as a quasi-independent third party that assists the corporation
in developing a compliance program that works best for that organization. Of course, the
monitor is there to provide assurances to the government that the corporation is actually doing
what it has committed itself to doing in the settlement agreement, but as we envision it the
monitor is also making a unique contribution. The monitor is in a position to go beyond basic
verification activities that may only further the isomorphic imitation of industry-standard

6

FORD & HESS

LAW & POLICY (FORTHCOMING 2011)

compliance protocols (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and to provide an element of clear-eyed,
impartial, and experienced human judgment that would otherwise be lacking. An adequate
degree of cognitive and structural independence from both the corporation and government is
critical.

6

Seeing the monitor‘s role in these broader terms shifts the frame of reference. To fulfill
this mandate, the ideal monitor needs a range of attributes in addition to independence, including
credibility with both regulator and firm; a wide range of skills including background knowledge
of compliance and corporate governance, enough comprehension of fairness and due process to
be able to identify scapegoating and other potential justice issues; strategic planning and
communication skills; and management skills including understanding organizational culture
(e.g., incentives, social norms) and the ability to generate useful (and ideally generalizable)
information.

7

We talk further below about the challenge involved in actually creating such highfunctioning, demanding, broadly-skilled monitorships.

With these attributes, though,

monitorships could offer meaningful benefits in the enforcement context and, relative to one-off
fines, provide significant advantages to both corporations and regulators.

(Without these

attributes – that is, if the monitor‘s function is only to verify the corporation‘s adoption of a
generic compliance protocol – we are somewhat sympathetic to critiques of the significant cost
and marginal benefit that monitorships bring.) In particular, a new governance monitorship
would be different and more effective than a fine as a mechanism for catalyzing cultural reform
because it is forward-looking and forces participation and creation of information.

Such

monitorships would use the organization‘s own language and norms to foster a dialogic process
of endogenous learning. This permits buy-in – which is especially essential when dealing with
problems of culture. Unlike in terrorem fines, credit-for-compliance, or credit-for-cooperation
schemes—which mainly set up incentives for corporations to avoid sanctions and signal to
regulators that they care about compliance—monitorships in their ideal form could be geared
toward a deeper project of actually investigating and embedding compliance values within the
corporation (Ford 2005). Moreover, the findings made through such a monitorship process have
the potential to be more ―valid‖, because they are based on sources of information that were
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drawn upon in a less high-pressure environment (relative to the acute enforcement stage). This
makes scapegoating and cosmetic compliance potentially both less of a risk and easier to detect.
Reminiscent of the ―benign big gun‖ argument developed by Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite almost two decades ago (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), we argue that there is real
value in embedding a new governance monitorship within the enforcement environment. We
make this claim, notwithstanding the recognized challenge that an enforcement context presents
for an approach that requires a degree of trust (Ford 2005), because the enforcement environment
is a crucial medium for forcing change within recalcitrant organizations. Meaningful corporate
reform that impacts the culture of the organization is something that is unlikely to occur within
the organization without external prompting, and unlikely to be done effectively without an
independent observer being involved. For many corporations—especially among those that have
been accused of significant wrongdoing—the compliance and ethics program may be viewed as
a cost to be minimized (Laufer 1999). Monitorships have the potential to create a space for
meaningful dialogue and introspection because, although they are situated within the
enforcement context, they are managed post-settlement and conducted by an independent third
party monitor. The presence of the monitor in the organization sends a strong signal to the
organization that reform must be taken seriously. It forces the company to direct resources to its
compliance and ethics functions. This is reflected in the comments of one the interviewees in
our study (which we describe below):
The greatest problem to effect change is the inevitable loss of momentum that
occurs inside an entity once the crisis has passed. Just the everyday pressures that
exist to do whatever business it is, to deal with whatever crisis there is, gets in the
way of actually completing whatever it is people agree is the right thing to do. So
having an independent consultant involved in the process puts a framework
around it, just like program management does to cause ordinary change to take
place. You need the discipline of someone outside the organization who’s got a
timeline, who’s got to report to somebody. You have to have an end date. When
you have those things, then you’ve managed to meet all the milestones and get it
done.
The ultimate goal, of course, would be to ensure that the corporation continues to manage
its corporate culture and update its compliance program once the monitorship ends. For this to
occur, the corporation must ―buy in‖ to the process. Again, consistent with the new governance
approach, the monitor and the corporation would have to work together to creatively solve
problems, as opposed to the government taking a command-and-control type approach to
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company‘s compliance and ethics program. This requires a level of mutual trust between the
monitor and corporate officers.

Absolute trust is neither required nor feasible, but the

corporation should trust that the monitor is basically working in the corporation‘s interest even
while ensuring that it is doing everything it can to prevent future violations of law. It also
requires the corporation to have trust in the process: trust that the government is imposing a
monitorship for the right reasons, and is not appointing a monitor that will, as one of our
interviewees described it, ―run amok‖ over the corporation.

Monitorships in Practice: Can They Meet the Expectations of New Governance
Regulation?
Research Approach
Our investigation took a qualitative research approach to examining whether, and to what
extent, monitorships in practice align with the new governance model in theory. We see this
approach as appropriate because corporate monitorships are still at a relatively early stage in
their development as an enforcement technique, and ours is one of the first empirical research
projects on this issue. Although we reach some tentative conclusions in this paper, we are
equally interested in raising questions and pointing out potential problems that should be
investigated by researchers in the future.
Our analysis is based on interviews and secondary data. Our interviews were primarily
with individuals that were insiders to the monitorship process.

We supplemented that

information with interviews with informants that were outside the monitorship process, but
whose expertise in corporate compliance gives us a valuable external perspective. We conducted
telephone interviews with 20 different individuals in Canada and the United States—whose
identities we agreed to keep confidential—in the summer of 2008. During the interviews, we
asked the individuals about their own direct experiences, as well as for their broader views on
monitorships. These were semi-structured interviews with questions covering all five stages of
the monitorship process shown in figure 1 below.
Nine of our interviews were with individuals that served as corporate monitors for the
DOJ and/or the SEC. We contacted 32 individuals identified as having served as monitors, based
on publicly available information as of spring 2008. We interviewed all nine individuals that
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agreed to speak with us. For a broader perspective, we interviewed one individual who served as
a monitor in multiple and varied institutional contexts over a long career dating back to some of
the earliest uses of monitorships. Six interviews were conducted with individuals that (currently
or in the recent past) served as prosecutors or regulators imposing monitorships. These
interviews were obtained by contacting relevant government agencies and by a snowballing
technique of asking interviewees to nominate other potential interviewees. The remaining
interviews were with well-established compliance consultants. These individuals were selected
for their ability to provide an outsider‘s perspective on corporate compliance programs, which
are at the heart of corporate monitorships. They provided more general, experience-based
accounts of what is necessary for a compliance program to be successful, and provided a
perspective from the company side. This was necessary because although we contacted all
corporations that we identified as being involved in monitorships, we received no response from
those companies.
The interview data is supplemented with secondary data. This includes public statements
made by monitors, compliance officers at companies that went through monitorships,
government officials, and corporate attorneys involved in the negotiation of settlement
agreements. Public statements were in the form of presentations at conferences, presentations
over the internet in ―webinars,‖ published articles, and interviews published in trade journals.
Our secondary data also includes the actual settlement agreements establishing the monitorships,
government press releases announcing the settlements, and any monitorship reports that had been
made publicly available (which is very rare).
This study has several limitations. First, those monitors and regulators that agreed to be
interviewed may be unrepresentative of the broader group. This concern is somewhat alleviated
by the fact that our interviewees described a wide range of experiences and opinions—both
positive and negative—which suggests that we may have captured a representative range of
views, even if we cannot draw robust conclusions about the distribution of those opinions among
monitors and others. Second, we do not have data on the success or failure of the monitorship
meaning, for example, how satisfactory were the changes to internal compliance processes, or
whether the monitorship succeeded in identifying root causes of wrongdoing or preventing
subsequent misconduct. Our analysis is based on our evaluation of what the monitors did or did
not do during the monitorship, as compared to expectations about what they should be doing
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based on the opinions of other monitors, compliance consultants, regulators, and the written
documents establishing the monitorships. Despite this limitation, our research approach allows
us to point out potential areas where practice may deviate from theory, and lay the groundwork
for future research in the monitorship context and other areas of new governance regulation.
Finally, we should note one secondary information source that we encountered after our
own interviews were completed, and that gives us greater confidence in our findings. Professor
Jayne Barnard investigated the SEC‘s use of monitorships by conducting eight interviews with
SEC enforcement staff and defense attorneys (who were typically former enforcement attorneys)
(Barnard 2008). Although she did not interview any monitors and focused only on SEC
monitorships, her findings support most of our findings, and her recommendations are generally
consistent with ours. Some of those findings are discussed below.
Understanding the Monitorship Process
To better understand monitorships, we divided the process into five stages: the decision
to settle and establish a monitorship, setting the scope of the monitorship, selecting the monitor,
conducting the monitorship, and post-monitorship learning (see figure 1).

Based on our

interviews and our review of the underlying documents available, we found that at each stage of
negotiation or implementation of a monitorship, there is the potential for a breakdown in the
process. This is especially problematic when problems at early stages of the process place the
monitorship on a downward spiral that effectively eliminates any prospect of achieving
meaningful reform at the corporation. Although our analysis of each stage (set out next) focuses
on the problematic areas, we are not saying that successful monitorships cannot and have not
occurred. Our research design does not permit us to make objective, definitive conclusions on
the success or failure of monitorships (either individually or as a whole). However, a hypothesis
based on our research would be that any positive results are due more to self-motivated
individual efforts of monitors and corporate officials, than to a system that can consistently
produce positive results over time. Thus, while recognizing the success stories (albeit selfreported by insiders), we focus on the potential problems which give some insight into the
difficulties of implementing new governance regulation in practice. This approach provides
lessons both for monitorships specifically and for new governance regulation more generally.
Figure 1 below sets out the five stages of the monitorship process.
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Figure 1.
Stage 1:
The Settlement
and Monitor
Decision.

Stage 5: PostMonitorship
Learning

Stage 2: Setting
the Scope of the
Monitorship

Stage 4:
Conducting the
Monitorship

Stage 3: Select
the Monitor

Figure 1. Stages of the Monitorship Process.
The Settlement Decision.

The first decision a regulator must make is whether to

indict/charge the corporation, agree to a settlement (with or without a monitor), or prosecute only
the individuals and not seek punishment for the corporation. Different strategies will be
appropriate in different contexts, with monitorships and compliance undertakings being
appropriate when the government concludes that the wrongful conduct is due at least in part to
the corporation‘s culture and/or to a faulty compliance program. The cost of a monitorship is
also easier to justify where more pervasive, serious, persistent corporate-level problems are
identified.
Although our interviewees consistently agreed on when monitorships should be used,
they had mixed opinions on whether or not monitorships were being used appropriately in
practice. One of our former prosecutor interviewees explained the decision in terms of the nature
and severity of the wrongdoing in question. If the company was, in that interviewee‘s words,
―rotten to the core‖, then it should be criminally indicted or subject to severe regulatory
sanctions. If the company‘s legal troubles were the result of a few rogue employees or an easily
fixed problem with company policies or procedures, then imposing a monitorship (and the costs
associated with it) would be unfair and unjustified. Although a settlement agreement may still be
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appropriate in these situations, the imposition of a monitor would not. In between these two
poles are those corporations that are not ―rotten to the core,‖ but do have significant cultural
problems that cannot be fixed by simple technical fixes to compliance programs. These are the
cases where a monitor is necessary to assist the corporation in reforming its compliance program
and culture, and to provide an independent determination as to whether the company has
implemented the changes in the settlement agreement effectively. A former prosecutor
interviewee stated, ―When the company has committed to all these reforms, it‘s just a promise,
you can‘t change culture overnight. The monitor‘s role is to see that there is follow through, the
company has committed, the monitor is there to see that it is completed.‖ Likewise, a monitor
interviewee stated:
So even in a situation in which you have rogue employees or companies or
individuals that got the company in trouble, under circumstances by which it
didn’t go all the way to the top but there’s a concern that maybe the company was
looking the other way because people were more profitable and maybe didn’t pay
too close attention or something else. That’s a situation in which it seems to me
that the government can say “We just don’t feel comfortable letting this company
go. We don’t think their compliance programs are mature enough, we don’t think
the management necessarily gets it.”
That monitor went on to describe a monitorship as a way for the Department of Justice
―to get the level of comfort that the corporation had learned its lesson, had implemented vigorous
compliance programs, sort of gotten the message and the message was learned all the way
throughout the corporation.‖ Overall, as another monitor stated, the goal is ―not to penalize the
shareholders for what happened in the past, but to prevent violations in the future.‖
Some of our interviewees, however, had concerns that the government‘s decision to
impose a monitorship on a corporation was becoming a default policy choice. The fear was that
government officials were not always considering whether the case at hand was one that could
significantly benefit from a monitorship, but instead were seeking to impose a monitorship as a
matter of routine. For example, one monitor stated, ―I have a little concern that . . . the SEC may
be using this tool in cases where it's not appropriate, where the problem is so narrow, and the
company already taken steps, or doesn't really require monitoring.‖ Another monitor stated, ―I
think there has been a tendency for [monitorships] to be the fall back position on many of these
cases.‖ Likewise, Barnard has found that the first draft of a settlement agreement is often
prepared by the most junior member of the enforcement team and that attorney typically includes
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a ―full-service compliance monitor‖ as a matter of routine (Barnard 2008: 817 ). A third monitor
we interviewed pointed out that even when a corporation agrees that the monitorship is
inappropriate, the corporation would not strongly challenge the government, because going to
trial would not be a ―responsible business decision.‖

Ultimately, this can contribute to

complaints that the company had been ―coerced‖ into the monitorship.
To the extent that the corporation perceives the monitor as being unnecessary and simply
pushed upon it by the government, the perceived legitimacy of monitorship can be severely
damaged. In such a situation, the corporation is less likely to enter the monitorship with the
cooperative mindset needed for it to be successful. Oppositely, for those interviewees that
thought the monitorship worked well, they attributed that success to buy-in to the monitorship
process and trust in the process. For example, one monitor believed he had a productive working
relationship with the company because ―the government and the company felt that the process
was fair and that they benefited from it.‖ This monitor believed that process was already off to a
productive start before he arrived because ―the parties concluded that this monitorship was a
good solution and my sense is that at the end of the day everybody seemed satisfied that the
objectives of aborting criminal prosecution and having a monitorship that helped ensure that the
implementation of compliance procedures.‖
The Scope of the Monitorship. Once the decision to impose a monitorship has been made,
the parties must set the terms of the monitorship. In many cases, it seems, the government starts
with a very demanding, generic version of a settlement agreement, whose terms are then
modified based on the strength of the corporation‘s negotiating position (see Barnard 2008).
Often, the government begins with a settlement agreement that includes all of the most stringent
terms used in other monitorships to date, after which the defense attorneys work to negotiate
away some of these terms by emphasizing the changes the company has already made and the
amount of money it has already spent on investigations and reforms (Barnard 2008). This can,
however, vary significantly based on the government attorney involved. Barnard (2008) found
that different attorneys have very different views on the importance of requiring monitors or
mandated compliance program changes, and those views are reflected in the final agreement. In
addition, Barnard (2008) found that some staff attorneys cared significantly less about the
company‘s remedial efforts when negotiating the final agreement than they did about what
individuals the company had terminated (including individuals the SEC was not planning on
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bringing legal action against). Thus, rather than a centralized, consistent policy applied to the
facts of the case at hand, the individual government attorney that is assigned to the case can be a
strong determinant of the scope of the monitorship. This is important, because all the monitors
we interviewed stated that they tried to strictly follow their duties as set out in the agreement.
However, as stated below, how they interpreted those duties also varied.
Selecting the Monitor. Monitors can be selected in a variety of ways. The government
may appoint the monitor, the corporation may select a monitor subject to the government‘s veto
power, or they may develop a system to jointly select a monitor. Regardless of the process used,
with striking frequency (especially at the DOJ), the end result was that the monitor chosen was a
former prosecutor or other government employee possessing little to no prior experience as a
monitor, and no formal training or experience in managing a corporate compliance program.
According to the majority of our interviewees, the reason for the significant use of former
prosecutors was not conflicts of interest (that is, current prosecutors selecting ex-prosecutors
based on personal ties), but perceptions of credibility. The government wants someone it can
identify with and believes it can trust, and the corporation wants to ensure its monitor has
credibility with the government. Likewise, Barnard (2008: 820-821) found that ―well-advised
companies know to turn to former SEC or DOJ staffers as their candidates – ‗somebody [the staff
lawyers] trust.‘‖
This raises a difficult question about the appropriate qualifications for being a monitor.
The monitors and regulators we interviewed thought it was appropriate that monitors should
typically be ex-prosecutors now acting as defense attorneys in private practice. Multiple
monitors said their role relied heavily on their ability to see things from both the prosecutorial
and defense perspectives, and to communicate with both types of audiences. After asserting the
intrinsic value of both of these perspectives, one monitor went on to state,
[y]ou have to mediate between those competing interests and also advocate - that
is, to say, persuade - the various interested parties of the wisdom of a given
solution. Those are all talents that a lawyer brings to the table, I think, more
often than not in a more effective way than a non-lawyer. Those are things
lawyers learn, those are things lawyers do.
By contrast, all of the compliance consultants we interviewed perceived significant
potential problems with the current profile of monitors. Overall, they felt that former-prosecutor
monitors were unlikely to have the experience or knowledge base necessary to analyze a
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corporation‘s culture or provide advice on how to manage that culture as it relates to the
corporation‘s compliance program. For example, these types of monitors are more inclined to
believe that the root causes of wrongdoing within the organization are employee ignorance of
laws and corporate policies, as opposed to management pressure to meet performance
expectations (see Edwards and Reid 2007). Thus, such monitors may be more likely to focus on
auditing internal controls and the content and breadth of training programs, while downplaying
cultural issues. Monitors we interviewed generally downplayed these concerns and stated that
non-lawyers or those without prosecutorial experience did not have the necessary ―legal
expertise‖ or mediating skills. We return to this issue in the following section.
Conducting the Monitorship. Overall, we found wide variation in how monitors
conducted their work – even where the language of the monitors‘ settlement agreements was
essentially identical (as is likely to occur when enforcement attorneys frequently borrow
language, if not the entire agreement, from prior settlement agreements (see Barnard 2008)).
Some monitors stated that, regardless of the precise text of their assignment, they had no choice
but to consider issues of corporate culture based on what the settlement agreement tasked them
with accomplishing. For example, one monitor described his job in the following terms:
You have to do enough work, interview enough people, sit in on enough of the
meetings where [corporate culture] can be observed, talk to people about how
they feel about the culture, look at the compliance activities that have occurred
and you ultimately form a judgment based upon that data, reviewing that data and
come to a conclusion and in this instance.
Another monitor focused on ―tone from the top‖ as the key part of corporate culture that
he was investigating. He stated,
You need systematic controls that make it difficult for people to violate the law
and you also need a very strong tone from the top. . . . If you don't have tone from
the top, then all your controls, people will just bypass them and work around
them. And if you have tone on the top but you don't have control, then there's
always going to be some people that take that tone from the top less seriously and
you've got to have ways of deterring them from doing bad things.
To examine these issues, that particular monitor interviewed people ―from the very top to
the very bottom‖ of the organization. Likewise, another monitor described the requirements of
his job as follows:
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[The monitor needs] enough of an understanding of the business of the entity to
have a sense for where the vulnerabilities are in the system and then obviously to
spend enough time with the compliance people and the auditors and the others
who are doing risk assessments to get a real sense of how seriously these folks are
taking their jobs and to try to also test it out in the field by getting a sense of how
comfortable do employees feel that if they have something they’ve observed and
they follow whatever hotline procedures or whatever other procedures at the
company that they’re going to get a favorable response without retaliation and
with the ability for anonymity if they feel the need to have anonymity and that sort
of thing.
Other monitors indicated that, although looking at corporate culture might have been part
of the job, it was not the monitor‘s job to direct the change in corporate culture. One monitor
stated that ―[I‘m] not sure it‘s the job of the monitor [to change corporate culture]. The job of
the monitor is to warn, you know where there‘s – where there‘s still a problem in culture, that is
what the monitor has to do.‖ He also stated, ―I would think it would be arrogant, maybe a little
arrogant or presumptuous if I monitored – think you‘re really going to transform corporate
culture.‖ Similarly, another monitors stated,
I wasn't appointed to change the corporate culture at [the company]. That said,
the broad topics that I was there to examine and report on went deeply into the
culture and required me to sort of make observations about the culture and about
how it influenced the compliance, you know, of the company, and as a
consequence, at least, my perception was dealing on almost a daily basis with
questions of corporate culture.
Some monitors did not explicitly consider issues of corporate culture at all. One monitor
told us that he focused only on the technical details of the compliance program and internal
controls. He did not focus on matters of culture, because he did not believe that culture could be
measured or audited, and further, that the phrase had no real meaning. He also stated that
evaluating it was beyond his assigned duties. Interestingly, the settlement agreement he was
operating under contained very similar language to the monitorship agreements described above,
and the press releases announcing that company‘s settlement agreements specifically attributed
the company‘s problems to a corrupt corporate culture.
Another aspect of the monitor‘s job is ongoing interaction with company and government
officials. With respect to interactions with the government, we saw significant variety in
practices. In one case, the settlement agreement required quarterly meetings between the
government, the company, and monitor. In other cases, the monitor‘s only interaction with the
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government after the monitorship started was through the filing of reports. In some cases, the
monitor stated that the reports were closely read and discussed with the monitor, but in other
cases the monitor received little to no feedback on the report.
Other monitors reported levels of interaction between the two extremes of regular, formal
meetings versus interaction only though the monitor‘s report. One monitor stated that he
regularly updated the government on what he was doing, but he did not have substantive
discussions on the progress of the company. He stated:
I think at least in our case it was a matter of keeping the government advised
about what kinds of activities the monitor was engaged in, how much involvement,
how much time and effort was being expended. We did detailed billings which set
out our activities, what we were doing, how we were doing it, why we were doing
it. They were given both to the company and the government so that the
government had a very clear road map of exactly what was being done and how
much effort was being put in to the process. But mostly I think that they were
observing that for purposes of determining whether or not they thought the
monitor was expending sufficient energy and effort at the task to give them the
comfort that an effective job is being done and the recommendations would be
well informed by the facts.
Barnard (2008) found that interactions between monitors and SEC was relatively
common, but it depended on the prior relationship between the monitor and SEC staff attorneys;
that is, ―close personal friends‖ (Barnard 2008: 822) communicated significantly more often than
those without a prior relationship.
Likewise, monitor interactions with company officials varied significantly. Although
some monitors described their role as being in part ―teacher,‖ no monitor described assuming an
authoritarian role. For example, one monitor had the impression that the monitor in the
WorldCom case (based on public reports filed by the monitor) directed the entire process based
on preconceived notions of what the company needed. The monitor we interviewed decided to
actively work against that model in developing his own approach, and was very open to the input
of those in the company. He qualified his comments by stating,
But I hasten to add …that there are times when you've got to say, this is the way
it's going to be. When there's a serious problem, or something that really
requires immediate attention, or raises very clear ethical issues. Plainly, under
those circumstances, you don't wait around or allow the company to take
anything less than the completely ethical position on a given issue.
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Other monitors made similar comments about the need to let the company work through
its own problems and to step in only to provide comments, not orders, unless the company was
not acknowledging or was clearly mismanaging particularly serious problems. A couple of
monitors mentioned actively working with the company‘s Chief Compliance Officer (or similar
role) to support that officer‘s positions within the organization, whether it was attempting to
change the minds of the general counsel‘s office or the board of directors.
Post-Monitorship.

Figure 1 above describes a continual monitorship process, within

which Stage 5 (Post-Monitorship Learning) feeds back to Stage 1 (the Settlement and
Monitorship Decision) with respect to a subsequent monitorship.

In practice, though, our

research suggests that Stage 5 learning may be sparse, and its relationship to a subsequent Stage
1 decision quite tenuous.

What happens after a monitorship ends is summarized by the

comments of one of our interviewees:
Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn’t, maybe nobody knows, because there’s
nobody out there evaluating these things. And unless a company gets caught
doing something improper again nobody may find out whether the deferred
prosecution agreement worked or didn’t work.
Our research indicates that once a monitorship ends, essentially no attempt is made to
understand its successes and failures as a process, or to shape future monitorships based on that
information. Although settlement agreement terms are replicated, the lessons of actual practice
are not being captured, particularly among criminal prosecutors. In addition, monitors‘ reports
are rarely made public so that others can attempt to use the information. We hasten to add that
our interviewees presented some strong arguments for not making these reports public.
Primarily, they believed that confidentiality could help to create a more open environment for
communication at the corporation during the monitorship, as individuals would not have to
worry about their statements being made public.
Concerns about Monitorships as New Governance Regulation
Our research was not designed to allow us to draw direct conclusions about what factors
support or impede a successful monitorship. Rather, we examine how monitorships operate in
practice compared to how new governance theory would propose that monitorships should
operate. The deviations between practice and theory seem to be many. Regardless of whatever
other purposes monitorships may serve, as implemented so-far in practice, they are ill-equipped
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to promote the kind of rich, deliberative, context-specific investigation that new governance
suggests can generate meaningful endogenous reform to corporate ethical culture.
Under a new governance approach, monitorships should be carefully crafted to fit the
case at hand, monitors should work closely with corporations to not only improve the technical
aspects of compliance programs and training exercises but also provide an outsider‘s
independent perspective on all important cultural issues that affect the implementation of
compliance programs, and lessons (both positive and negative) should be captured and used to
continually improve the design and implementation of monitorships. The above evidence shows
a significant potential for breakdowns in this system. For example, in the absence of systematic,
explicit, and context-specific methods for designing monitorships, form may trump function.
That is, new monitorships could be established based on boilerplate from prior monitorships,
with little to no attention to ―fit.‖ Alternatively, the same absence of adequate and justifiable
specificity could lead to excessive discretion on the part of prosecutors or monitors.
Monitorships could be imposed and structured based on the particular beliefs of the government
official that happens to be leading the investigation at hand. Setting the scope of the monitorship
and defining the monitor‘s assignment may then be the product of an adversarial negotiation
within which prosecutors reflexively seek the harshest terms possible, and the corporation seeks
to negotiate away those terms. When it comes to choosing a monitor, one is selected based on
credibility with the government rather than a matching of skills with the demands of the
situation, which impacts how the monitor carries out the process. Finally, information on specific
monitorship outcomes and strategies is not aggregated or analyzed, so cannot be used to improve
the process going forward.
The US federal government has taken some steps to improve monitorships, which are
consistent with solving some of the potential problems we have identified. In 2009, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study of deferred and non-prosecution
agreements, including both those with and without monitors, and found evidence of process
improvements at the DOJ during that year (GAO 2009). For example, the DOJ implemented a
system to centrally track the use of settlement agreements, the terms of the agreements, and the
variation between agreements based on the facts of the case. Prior to 2009, the DOJ did not
collect any data on the use of DPAs. The GAO observed that data collection would allow the
DOJ to accurately report on the number and terms of DPAs to Congress and the public, to
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identify best practices, and to ensure consistency across agreements. The GAO also strongly
encouraged the DOJ to develop performance measures, which it had not done, in order to gauge
the effectiveness of settlement agreements and to support the continuous improvement of DPAs
over time. The GAO‘s suggested performance measures included whether the company
continued engaging in the wrongful behavior and how well the company had implemented the
terms of the agreement.
The GAO also noted that the DOJ had implemented a more centralized process for
selecting monitors. The primarily goal of this change was to decrease perceptions of favoritism
in monitor selection. However, a more centralized process does not significantly advance our
recommendation that monitors be selected based on having a broad and appropriate skill set and
not just for their ―credibility‖ with prosecutors. We could make other reform recommendations
directed toward fine-tuning the existing system (see Ford and Hess 2009). Here, though, we want
to explore the possibility that there may be deeper issues at play that will ultimately influence the
success of monitorships, and these are issues that do not have easy fixes. In the next section, by
considering subtle sociological characteristics of monitorships-as-implemented, we ask whether
these internal reforms will be sufficient for monitorships to reach their full potential in light of
the institutional environment in which they operate.

Remaining Challenges
The Status Quo Bias
In a recent article, Professor Miriam Baer challenged the assumptions underlying
monitorships, the depiction of monitorships as new governance mechanisms, and the usefulness
of corporate compliance programs in general (Baer 2009). In her view, it is not actually possible
to embed a new governance style monitorship within the prosecutorial or enforcement context.
She argues that because compliance is regulated through a profoundly adversarial, ―quasiadjudicative‖ system that pits prosecutors against defense counsel, there is no opportunity for the
experimental, information-based, collaborative structure that monitorships envision. Moreover,
there is little possibility that a new governance regulatory style will ever take hold in that
environment.

21

FORD & HESS

LAW & POLICY (FORTHCOMING 2011)

Although Professor Baer‘s work does not engage directly with the empirical results we
describe here, her argument and our observations about how many monitorships are functioning
well in practice are not necessarily at odds.

Like her, we recognize the torque that the

adversarial environment puts on monitorships (though unlike her, we do not see the problem as
insurmountable, and we see the motivating effect of enforcement action as potentially positive.)
We probably put more stock in the fact that some monitorships do produce good outcomes, at
least according to self-reports of the monitors we interviewed, if for no other reason than that this
shows it is possible for individual monitors to transcend the adversarial background relationship
that appointed them.
Along with us, Baer is concerned about the relationships between the prosecutor, the
corporation, and the monitor. Interestingly, however, our largest worry about the impact of this
relationship on the success of monitorships is almost the mirror image of hers. In her view,
irreducible adversarialism makes the prospects for new governance monitorships dim. These
concerns are supported by the comments of one monitor we interviewed who thought that giving
the government too much power in a monitorship to bring additional charges, for example, based
on what a monitor had learned, could harm the process by reducing trust. According to that
interviewee, a monitorship needed to operate in a space outside of direct enforcement
involvement because that is required to allow the company and the monitor to communicate
frankly and work through problematic issues. The specter of renewed enforcement staff presence
jeopardizes the trust that is essential to that process.
Our primary concern, however, is not with excessive prosecutorial/enforcement
overhang, but with not enough ambition in the process to induce real change in corporations.
Rather than sharing too little ground, we are concerned that monitors, prosecutors, and subject
corporations‘ executives share too much. We are concerned that monitorships are embedded in a
regulatory environment that is not actually designed to significantly destabilize the status quo.
Enforcement actions against corporations that have compromised ethical cultures should be
designed to be destabilizing. Yet, there is a real risk that monitorships can become ―closed
shops.‖ That is, the participants share a fundamental unity of interest around keeping the
monitorship project and the corporation‘s rehabilitation moving ahead smoothly, without the
fundamental reform of a corporation envisioned by monitorships in theory. In many cases, it
seems that none of the parties involved—the corporation, the government agency, or the
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monitor— has an incentive to drive the monitorship beyond technical fixes and good optics for
the sake of external stakeholders, and toward something more profound, uncertain, and
unpredictable (in the way that real, open-ended dialogue and root analysis can be).
Note that we are not making an explicit capture argument here (though there may be
some of that). We are making a microsociological, implementation-level claim. Although there
will be exceptions, our concern is that the parties may share interests that lead to the creation of
an underambitious system of monitorships. The corporation naturally wants to retain as much
freedom as possible and it will push the government and the monitor to devise and implement as
limited a monitorship as possible. It is helped in its case by the argument that unaccountable
monitors should not be permitted to ―run amok‖ through a public company‘s internal operations
at shareholders‘ expense. Within the existing monitorship paradigm, monitors may not provide
significant push-back against the corporation‘s limited interpretation of their monitorship
mandate, because they may be disposed to view the corporation as their ―client.‖ This view may
arise from the close working relationship that develops over time, the corporation‘s role in
selecting that monitor in certain cases, and the monitor‘s background as a corporate defense
attorney in private practice (which is a common career move for former prosecutors). Finally,
government enforcers – especially on the criminal side – may be more focused on closing their
file and moving on to the next case, rather than pushing the monitor to dig deeper into the
workings of the corporation. Thus, there is a significant difference between reaching (and then
publicizing) the settlement agreement, and actually ensuring the monitorship as implemented is
capable of having a lasting positive effect on corporate ethical culture. Prosecutors may not even
be the right people to oversee monitorships, as prosecutors hire monitors precisely because they
do not have the skills or bandwidth to do it themselves. They may not even know the right
questions to ask to verify performance. The end result is the strong likelihood of low ambition
monitorships focused on technical compliance with policy and procedure requirements.
We discussed monitors‘ skill sets, above, and the compliance consultants‘ complaint that
former prosecutors are ill-equipped to act as effective monitors. We recognize that professional
competition may play a role in the compliance consultants‘ assessment (Siporin 1978). Yet we
are inclined to take the critique seriously given the long experience of the particular consultants
we spoke with, and the general high regard in which these individuals are held. We are also
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concerned about a separate way in which former prosecutors‘ relationships and affinity exert
effects on monitors‘ capacity to act as meaningful change agents.
As discussed further below, former prosecutors tend to be chosen to be monitors not
primarily because of intrinsic conflicts of interest, or regulatory/prosecutorial capture. Instead,
they are chosen because of the perception that credibility with agency staff attorneys – which
includes trust and a background in the same professional culture – is an essential job
requirement.

Virtually by definition, this puts something of a conformist spin on the

monitorship‘s trajectory.
It is noteworthy that monitors describe themselves as meaningfully straddling boundaries
and bridging divides because they can speak from within both the prosecutorial and defense bar
perspectives. These can be significantly different perspectives, but both are legal perspectives.
An additional job requirement, but one that further narrows the pool of candidates, is the ability
to speak the language of business.

This includes having credibility with business people

(something that monitors may find themselves anxious to demonstrate) and sharing a value
system that supports the social good that corporations generate. It also includes a desire to
maintain control over the cost of the monitorship and ―add value‖ to that corporation. As an end
result, the monitorships are not open to new perspectives and destabilizing change.
Other factors also impact this bias towards the status quo. We were struck by one
interviewee‘s confidence, almost insistence, in telling us about how a certain agency develops its
monitorships based directly on prior monitorship templates. Like most, this monitor was a
former prosecutor now engaged in corporate defense work at a large firm. In interviewing him,
we had the sense that his understanding of the internal workings of that agency – including his
personal acquaintance with key individuals and his stated knowledge of their intentions – was a
source of professional pride for him, and that it had some currency in his present work
environment. This makes sense: talented former prosecutors are often hired by large firms
precisely because they possess this knowledge.
The potential consequence, though, is that individuals like the one we interviewed, once
they have left the prosecutor‘s office, may develop a vested interest in preserving the value of
their inside knowledge (Crano 1995; Giacolone and Paul Rosenfield 1989), even as their
firsthand experience of it recedes into the past. They may become more likely to resist change,
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more inclined to downplay change they see, and even inclined to rhetorically overstate how
certain and entrenched practices were in their prosecutorial office when they were there, in order
to ratchet up the significance of their insider knowledge. An individual in this position may
perceive that he or she has more to gain from knowing how that office works, than in
interrogating the merits of its approach. In concrete terms, in the monitorship situation, this
could translate into a resistance to helping to tailor monitorships to suit particular contexts, if that
would undermine the force of one‘s inside knowledge about prosecutorial process. (It also
reminds us that what we learn about institutional process through interviews is necessarily
filtered through the lens of our interviewees.) The result may be that, as a function of their very
interpositioning between prosecutorial and defense bar, the individuals most likely to be chosen
as monitors may also be among the least likely to push the boundaries of the structure‘s
potential. What this suggests is a potentially wicked tension between credibility or perceived
expertise, and thoroughgoing reform.
The problems of deep affinity, and a substantial shared preference for the status quo on
the part of all the parties to a monitorship, also shows in the two further areas discussed below.
The first we have already touched upon and is the selection of monitors based above all on their
credibility with a particular in-group set of prosecutors, and their possession of a particular,
narrow set of background experiences and skills. The second way in which the ultimately
conservative nature of monitorships manifests itself is in the surprising failure of prosecutors to
gather meaningful data about monitorships, analyze them, develop performance measures, or
otherwise try to build a regulatory structure outward from the monitorship environment.
Monitorships have become a central part of a prosecutor‘s tool kit, but they are still at an ad hoc
and under-analyzed stage of development.

This suggests, at best, considerable regulatory

distraction. These specific problems may also help to shed light on the stress points for the
effective implementation of new governance regulatory approaches generally. Understanding
the parties‘ deep incentives is essential to understanding how and whether any new governance
monitorship structure could actually be operationalized.
Monitor Selection: Credibility, Insularity, and Expertise
One of our monitors told us that ultimately, successful monitorships were a function of a
monitor‘s hard-to-duplicate personal characteristics. We were told that it may be ―impossible for

25

FORD & HESS

LAW & POLICY (FORTHCOMING 2011)

monitorships to be institutionalized‖ because ―[t]he kind of self-restraint, the kind of self-critical
analysis, the kind of self-discipline that you need to be a monitor is very, very, very unusual and
there‘s nothing that really prepares you for it.‖ We do not dispute that an exceptionally talented
person can, and probably often does, make the difference. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict
in advance whether a particular person will have the qualities that will make him or her effective
as a monitor. Moreover, from a regulatory design perspective, this personal perspective is
unsatisfactory because it suggests that successes may not be replicable and that learning cannot
be transferred.
We are inclined toward a skills-based, rather than personal, account of the successful
monitor. We believe that we can identify attributes, experiences, and training that are helpful for
the monitorship role. As an initial step for reform, the monitor selection criteria should focus
more on the appropriate skills that a monitor brings to the monitorship, and less on notions of
credibility. In this area, there are significant insights to be derived from Susan Sturm‘s work on
institutional intermediaries (Sturm 2006).

Sturm emphasizes the need to identify those

individuals that have credibility within multiple fields (in her case, in science and gender equity)
yet that still have sufficient counterweight allegiances to resist being pulled in by the
organization‘s worldview. In one sense, measuring skills in purely legal experience terms, the
monitors that are being chosen by the DOJ and SEC are the ones that ought to have these dualworld attributes already. They have prosecutorial and defense experience and therefore have
credibility with both regulators and firms. The problem is that they may lack the broader skill set
that a compliance expert would bring, and that a particular monitorship may call for.
The open issue is whether our proposal to re-examine monitor selection criteria could
ever gain traction, or whether this tendency for credibility to trump competency is an inevitable
byproduct of the enforcement environment – or perhaps the white collar and financial regulatory
environment. As some of our interviewees stated in response to questions about why so many
monitors are former prosecutors:
… [I]f you are the company looking to retain somebody, you want to have
somebody that the regulator is going to view as a credible force. … [Y]ou sort of
only have one shot at it and you want a household name about whose integrity no
one is going to call to question …
Similarly, another interviewee stated:
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I think the comfort level that the government might have in the monitor is
important not only to the government but the more credibility the monitor has
with the government the better off the company can be too because if the company
has a monitor who has done an effective job and has made recommendations that
are going to be received and accepted by the government, that’s good for all
concerned.
Identifying a structural fix – ensuring that monitors with appropriate skills are selected –
does not respond to the problem that, in the enforcement environment, the overriding priority is
that the monitor has sufficient credibility and gravitas, as those terms are understood within that
milieu. This is the priority for both the firm (which, as our interviewee noted above, has only
―one shot‖ at it), and the regulator (which is not in a position to conduct a substantive review of
the monitor‘s work). When we think about what a truly effective institutional intermediary
might look like in this enforcement environment, then, we find it difficult to move past some
precarious combination of the existing monitors‘ background, plus expertise in corporate
compliance, root cause analysis and dialogue facilitation, plus maybe even the kind of bedrock
personal characteristics that our monitor interviewee referred to above.
Even if we could find such people, this pushes us to an expertise-based, in-group oriented
approach. The problem is exacerbated by embeddedness within an enforcement environment.
Our interviewees told us that in order to be effective, monitors had to be credible with
prosecutors and firms. This required that they have the background qualifications and expertise
in business and law (and sometimes even specific to the relevant industry). While this makes
sense, it significantly narrows the range of experiences and perspectives that are introduced into
the process. Being lawyers, these monitors may be less likely to recognize organizational
cultural issues and be less well equipped to respond to them. Our view, by contrast, is that
organizational culture is a prime determinant of organizational misconduct.

Being former

prosecutors, they are members of a particular professional culture, and a professional community
that intersects and overlaps in multiple ways (including through ―revolving door‖ employment
relationships) with the lawyers that represent the firms they prosecute.
Some of the monitorships we looked at seemed based on the assumption that public
companies and financial firms were key contributors to social welfare who, ultimately, did not
need not be scrutinized to the degree that racketeer-influenced unions (an earlier subject of
monitorships and a precursor to current corporate monitorships) did. It is relevant that we
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conducted our interviews in summer 2008, before the financial crisis reached its zenith. Viewing
monitorships in the wake of what the financial crisis has taught us about the pathologies in
financial and banking regulation internationally, however, makes us somewhat more sympathetic
to the view that DPAs and analogous regulatory settlements are (at least somewhat
unconsciously, in our view) ―soft landings‖ for a privileged set of large corporations and
financial firms. Interestingly, one lesson that we may ultimately draw from the global financial
crisis is how catastrophic the effects of this kind of insular regulatory method can be when
operating on an industry-wide, or even economies-wide, scale. The financial crisis has multiple
direct and indirect causes. Without signing onto the angry populism characterizing some current
perspectives, it does seem that industry‘s confidence in self-regulation, combined with the failure
of regulators to approach industry‘s self-account with the requisite degree of skepticism and
independent-mindedness, is part of the story of the financial crisis. Similar cultural patterns –
monitors‘ adoption of the value-oriented language of business, regulators‘ and prosecutors‘
failure to build adequate accountability and verification mechanisms into their responsibilities –
seem to underlie monitorships‘ structural shortcomings as catalysts of reform.
What monitorships and the recent financial crisis both demonstrate is that one should not
underestimate the tendency of systems to perpetuate themselves. Disentrenchment is difficult,
and contingent. Even with the architecture of reform that a monitorship puts around a change
process, monitorships can fall victim to subtle, even unconscious, undermining by precisely
those actors who might otherwise be in a position to force real destabilization. There is more to
creating deep systemic change than building a system that has the potential to do so. No matter
how promising that system in theory, resistant subcultures can thwart effective change
(Gunningham and Sinclair 2009). This is as true of regulators, and of monitorships, as it is of
corporate ethical cultures. It is potentially as true of new governance and its sister forms of
regulation as it is of monitorships in particular.
Lack of a System of Learning-Based Monitorships
The tendency of monitorships to favor the status quo is also manifest in what regulators
do with the information being generated by them. Theoretically, the specter of a renewed
prosecution or other enforcement action remains in the background when a settlement-based
monitorship is imposed, and it keeps the monitorship credible. As we discuss above, this will
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not be a real threat where monitors‘ reports are not subject to meaningful scrutiny and
corporations do not ―fail‖ their monitorships at the end of the agreement‘s term. It is not wrong
to suggest that regulators need to wield a credible ―big stick‖ to ensure that monitorships are
more than a cosmetic exercise. Regulators are the ones with the ultimate responsibility for
ensuring that these projects are effective. Moreover, even if they do not have the ideal expertise
for performing this role, their capacity to scrutinize monitorships would be significantly
augmented if they engaged in the kinds of comparative information analytics that new
governance theory argues for.
The lessons of monitorships‘ successes and failures must be collected and reflected back
to other monitors if anything more than ad hoc improvement over time is to be expected.
Monitors‘ forensic work on failed compliance programs could also help improve compliance
practice at corporations across the board. This is valuable information that should be used by the
government in structuring and operating monitorships in the future, but should also be available
to monitors, who currently have to develop their monitorship approach from scratch.
Learning from monitorships also calls for a new regulatory and prosecutorial orientation,
around information as a central driver of enforcement policy. Compared to the risk regulation of
structured financial products, for example, analyzing monitorships is not especially difficult or
complex. However, it does require a capacity and attention that – as the GAO pointed out – the
DOJ in particular has not given to monitorships until recently. Monitorships will not amount to
new governance learning-by-doing methods if the regulator has not developed the structures
necessary to draw information out of the discrete monitorship situations and into its larger
analytical and regulatory processes (Ford 2010).

The fact that monitorships appoint an

independent third party to conduct the monitorship itself does not automatically mean that fewer
regulatory resources are needed. On the contrary, substantially more and more sophisticated
analytical resources may be called for. Currently, neither prosecutors/enforcement staffers nor
judges possess the skill set to make the kinds of assessments required.
However, this leaves unanswered some difficult questions about regulatory expertise and
the ―soft‖ judgments that have to be made around compliance in the first place. Corporate
culture in particular (as opposed to structural compliance) is difficult to measure and often
significantly organization-specific. Without discounting the value of expertise in corporate
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compliance and governance in appointed monitors, the fact remains that problems of corporate
ethical culture are internal problems, and changing them requires an endogenous shift.

A

monitorship is an expertise-based intervention aimed at promoting more lasting, internal change.
Given how slippery culture can be, and how circumscribed monitorships currently seem to be,
we should perhaps be considering whether monitorships need to be broadened, in terms of
concept and participation, in order to be effective.
Specifically, what we originally envisioned as a prosecutorial decision to delegate ―soft‖
and difficult assessments of corporate cultural factors to a monitor, on the basis that the
prosecutor did not possess the necessary skills, mindset, or capacity, has turned out to be a
prosecutorial decision to delegate this kind of work to other people that are very much like the
prosecutors themselves. This may partially explain the lack of post-monitorship follow up and
learning. A prosecutor that has delegated an assignment to someone very much like herself will
not feel compelled, or even necessarily comfortable about, second guessing that work product
once finished. Softer questions of corporate culture, which might require more careful and more
long term analysis, are beyond both the scope of the monitor‘s report and to some degree the
prosecutor‘s own analytical frame. The fact that the monitor‘s report then predictably focuses on
concrete and legalistic outputs, such as new training programs, amounts to a form of ―trained
incapacity‖ (Veblen 1914) that reinforces the shared legal culture and makes it even more
difficult than before to talk about hard notions of culture.
We may be able to ratchet up the capacity of current players in the monitorship process
by establishing monitorship oversight mechanisms that involve a larger group of stakeholders.
One promising option, proposed by Christine Parker during the workshop that catalyzed this
volume, would be to involve something along the lines of Michael Dorf‘s and Jeff Fagan‘s
―problem-solving courts‖ in monitorship oversight (Parker 2009, Dorf and Fagan 2003). In
Parker‘s view, at the heart of negotiated settlements like monitorships (as well as at the broader
heart of what Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur have described as ―regulatory capitalism‖:
Jordana and Levi-Faur 20048) is a tension between the individualized, flexible and often private
negotiation of solutions to business wrongdoing, and the legitimate public interest in what
solutions are negotiated and how effectively they bring policy goals and values into business.
Consistent with our findings, Parker identifies a disjunction between the kinds of institutions and
practices currently available, and what regulatory capitalism demands as measured against its
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own theoretical ideal. Like new governance, what regulatory capitalism demands are public
institutions that can engage business firms in true negotiated settlement processes with their
communities. She proposes that, rather than relying on traditional courts to oversee negotiated
settlements, what the theory demands are more participatory ‗problem-solving courts‘. This
represents a move away from a controlled, expertise-based model and toward a more
participatory one.

It is a process – starkly different from the status quo – that puts the

participatory, dialogic elements of new governance at the center of its method. For firms with
the worst organizational culture problems, in light of the DOJ‘s failure to make monitorships
deeply effective, we should consider the possibility that opening the process up to this form of
oversight will spur reform and accountability that is currently somewhat wobbly.
Using problem-solving courts to assess monitorships is a well-reasoned response to a
problem that we recognize in very similar terms, but we want to suggest that increased public
participation and a more dialogic method in monitorship oversight could take any number of
forms. Another possibility, put forward by Rosabeth Moss Kanter and Rakesh Khurana of
Harvard Business School, would be for a South African style truth and reconciliation
commission (Kanter and Khurana 2009). Kanter and Khurana proposed a Financial Truth and
Reconciliation Commission be established to deal with the aftereffects of the financial crisis,
including populist rage and its negative side effects for market and consumer confidence. They
see a Truth and Reconciliation Commission model as a process based on sharing narratives, local
level reconciliation efforts, and public financial education ―that can engage a large portion of the
population in the search for truth and a basis for trust‖.
Given the serious risks associated with the truth and reconciliation commission proposal
in particular, however, and its certain unpopularity with corporations, we would be chary about
endorsing it except as a deterrent ―penalty default‖ (Karkkainen 2003) that firms and monitors
would work hard to avoid. Howevr, the benefits of introducing a more participatory, dialogic
process might include that it has the potential to be profoundly destabilizing and to activate
endogenous self-examination and change; it meaningfully recognizes who the stakeholders are in
the modern firm; and it broadens the range of perspectives and amount of information available,
to create better decisions and greater perceived legitimacy. Especially if the in-groupness of the
worlds of white collar and securities law is a primary concern—and this world will include
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judges, as well as the prosecutors and defense counsel from whose ranks they are elevated —
problem-solving courts and truth and reconciliation commissions hold considerable appeal.
Clearly, proposals to bridge the gap between the participatory, open-ended processes
envisioned by new governance theory and the exigencies of practical regulatory settlements face
considerable challenges. We are not suggesting that monitorships are beyond fixing, or that
more participatory oversight processes of any stripe would necessarily be more accountable than
monitorships in their current iterations; only that we should not automatically rule out more
participatory measures as ―backstops‖. In general, public process would be more logistically
difficult than closed ones. Even if we see the public process as a deterrent penalty default to be
used in only the most desperate circumstances, the public process would have to be insulated
enough from civil liability that a dialogic process was possible. Otherwise, it could become just
another forum for adversarialism, opportunism, and cosmetic compliance.

Prosecutors,

companies, and monitors may find themselves even more unwilling to make the monitorship
process a challenging one if civil liability loomed to this degree. In the context of principlesbased securities regulation, one commentator suggested that open, principles-based regulatory
structures would not function well in American securities regulation because of that national
system‘s heavy reliance on ex post enforcement and civil liability (Wallison 2007). To the extent
that monitorships also try to create an open-ended process in the context of an enforcementoriented environment, they may be subject to the same limits. More public processes, whether
they look like problem-solving courts or truth and reconciliation commissions, would not be
immune from contagion from the effects of sweeping civil liability. In other words, we should
be mindful that, just like monitorships, more open-ended and dialogic processes generally may
risk being downgraded to less ambitious models because of underlying cultural factors, including
the fear of liability, that are external to their regulatory design.

Conclusion
Our research shows how monitorships in practice are at serious risk of amounting to less
ambitious interventions than was hoped for by many proponents and feared by many critics. As
compared to the theoretical ideal of a new governance process, many monitorships were not
primarily directed toward ongoing problem-solving, or built around highly participatory and
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carefully structured dialogue.

Regulators and prosecutors did not employ reason-giving,

transparent processes, benchmarking and outcome analysis, or structured processes for sharing
information.

These learning mechanisms did not appear to be sufficiently built into the

regulatory structures around monitorships.

These monitorships did not push individual

corporations to improve their outcomes by comparison to the (aggregated and confidentialityprotecting) experience of others. Prosecutors typically maintained the most minimal oversight
role. They failed to develop adequate data analytical capacity, to generate useful information, or
to follow up. This essay tries to identify some of the significant, if subtle, microsociological
forces contributing to the basic conservatism of the monitorship model as practiced.
An initial reaction may be that monitorships have turned out not to actually be new
governance structures at all. Certainly, as implemented, they are not perfect examples of new
governance methods.

To portray the results of our research as a game-ending conceptual

challenge to new governance itself would be to mischaracterize it. Yet, in spite of the distance
between theory and effective implementation, is still useful to discuss monitorships through a
new governance lens. The concerns listed above do not lead us to completely abandon the
monitorship project, for the same reason that we do not abandon imperfect new governance
efforts: the lack of alternatives. We continue to see a place for (and the possibility of) an
improved monitorship structure in white collar and financial regulation.

The existing

alternatives—blunt sanctions and credit-for-cooperation schemes—were not previously and are
still not satisfactory responses to the challenges of corporate ethical culture that, we believe, was
a strong argument for the use of monitorships in the first place.
This paper tries to shed light on the sociological and institutional forces that contributed
to the underambitious nature of corporate monitorships. Improving real-life regulation requires
engaging with and learning from the half measures, near misses, and failures (especially
recurring or similar ones) that hint at the aspects of the model that are hardest to implement in
light of any particular context. In order to make new governance an effective approach, we must
continue to learn about which elements are indispensable and, just as importantly, how to ensure
they are in place given the particular conditions in a specific regulatory environment.
The fact that incremental decisions taken at every stage (see figure 1) of many
monitorships degraded their ability to destabilize the status quo sheds light on deeper problems
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related to the insularity of the group that administers the white collar and financial regulation
regime in the United States in particular. Under these conditions – the absence of a diverse set of
voices, the centrality of esoteric knowledge and membership in a small professional community,
an underlying desire to avoid significantly destabilizing public companies – we cannot be
confident that meaningful monitorships, or meaningful new governance initiatives of any sort,
will result on their own. The relative absence of alternative, challenging perspectives within the
regulatory conversation also compromises the quality of decisions. Compensatory strategies,
including perhaps problem-solving courts or other more public mechanisms for overseeing
monitorships, need to be developed to address those conditions directly. But problems of power
and access are not unique to new governance, and they do not go away if new governance goes
away. Understanding how new governance initiatives will play out within the dynamics and
institutional processes of particular regulatory regimes is an essential step in making new
governance an effective tool for regulatory design.
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3

Or, in Australia, ―enforceable undertakings‖ (Parker 2003).
For an overview, see generally, (Greenblum 2005); (Orland 2006); (O‘Hare 2006); and (Garrett 2007).
5
For a discussion of similar factors, see (Treviño, et al. 1999); see also ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER (2007) (stating
that ―four elements shape ethical culture: ethical leadership, supervisor reinforcement, peer commitment to ethics,
and embedded ethical values‖).
6
Thus, use of the term ―monitor‖ is perhaps misleading. A monitor is not an extension of the government, but
should function as a team member. Likewise, the use of the term ―independent consultant‖ (a term often used by
the SEC), may also be misleading, as the monitor is a team member with real powers, as not simply a provider of
recommendations that the corporation may or may not use at its discretion.
7
Having monitors with information collection skills is important because to make monitorships effective as a
broader regulatory strategy, the regulator also needs the ability to centrally aggregate the data coming from
discrete monitorships in order to make risk assessment and outcome evaluation possible.
8
Regulatory capitalism is a separate concept from new governance, but the two share commitments to collaborative,
problem-solving , broadly participatory and non-hierarchical governance methods; transparency, accountability, and
reason-giving as policy priorities at the regulatory level, endogenous learning and firm responsibility for its own
reform, though underpinned by public consequences; and the establishment of learning mechanisms in place at both
firm and regulator. (See Parker, 2010.)
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